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Section I – An Introduction 
The clergy privilege, or penitent privilege, protects communications between clergymen 
and the penitent. It is a privilege that is deeply rooted in the history of United States and has 
developed alongside other evidentiary privileges. However, the penitent privilege is not as cut and 
dry as the other categories of privilege communication. It is a staple of religious free exercise in 
this country.1 The free exercise of religion is a protected right, guaranteed in the First Amendment 
of the United States Constitution.2 Challenges to the privilege, and by extension free exercise, must 
contend with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) which was enacted to ensure 
religious freedoms and a strict scrutiny standard of review when such claims are raised.3  
These religious guarantees are cast in a different light, however, when considering the 
Federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA). This Federal statute requires 
individuals to report known or suspected instances of child abuse or neglect.4 Under CAPTA, each 
state, in its own individual action plans, must include provisions of state law “for mandatory 
reporting by individuals required to report such instances.”5  
With these various factors in mind, the primary issue is whether RFRA requires CAPTA 
to retain the privilege for religious communications from the mandatory reporting. A secondary 
issue is whether the privilege is a permissible accommodation, with or without RFRA, or whether 
that accommodation violates the Establishment Clause which expressly prohibits the endorsement 
or undue favoritism of religion. 6 
 
1 See generally People v. Phillips, 1 Western L. J. 109 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813). 
2 U.S. CONST. Amend. I, § 1. 
3 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. 
4 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(i) 
5 Id. 
6 U.S. CONST. Amend. I, § 1.  
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It can be argued that it is imperative that the penitent privilege coexist with the CAPTA. 
The protection of the penitent privilege is vital to the free exercise of religion in this country. The 
penitent privilege must be evaluated through the lens of RFRA, as RFRA reinstates strict scrutiny 
and a compelling interest test. The privilege promotes the search for spiritual guidance and 
communication with others in a private setting. Despite any government interest that would wish 
to repeal or diminish the privilege, maintaining the privilege is arguably the least restrictive 
alternative in furthering the government’s interest.  
The penitent privilege does not violate the Establishment Clause either. The privilege was 
not specifically created to promote participation in religion. The penitent privilege is just one of 
many recognized privileges and is not without its limits. It can be argued that the penitent privilege 
favors some religions over others because not all religious practice the rite of confession. However, 
the wording of the penitent privilege is neutral and permits the religions to benefit from the 
protection if they choose to utilize the religious ceremony of confession.  
The repeal or abrogation of the penitent privilege would cause greater issues. The repeal 
of the penitent privilege would inhibit the free exercise of religion, and any facially neutral attempt 
to curtail privileges may raise concerns of unconstitutional legislative targeting of religions like in 
in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah.7 The penitent privilege is deeply rooted in 
this country’s jurisprudence and tradition.8 The penitent privilege should not be repealed. There 
are alternate means of discovering evidence of child maltreatment that are not protected by the 
penitent privilege. 
Section II – The Penitent Privilege and CAPTA 
 
7 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
8 See generally People v. Phillips, 1 Western L. J. 109 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813). 
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The Clergy Privilege is a long-standing legal principle, dating back to the early nineteenth 
century.9 All states have recognized some form of the priest-penitent privilege.10 People v. Phillips 
is perhaps one of the earliest cases to recognize the privilege.11 In Phillips, the state sought to 
compel the priest’s testimony, but the priest refused to testify after a penitent parishioner confessed 
to him about an alleged theft.12 The New York Court of General Sessions noted the importance of 
protecting religious communications during the Roman Catholic sacrament of confession.13 The 
Court protected the communications between a priest and a member of the parish in the sacrament 
of confession, thus promoting free exercise of religion and christening the clergy privilege.14 This 
privilege, like the attorney-client privilege and the physician-patient privilege, exists to advance 
the “development of confidential relationships that are socially desirable.”15 Ultimately, the priest 
in Phillips was able to ensure the return of the stolen property.16 The penitent did the right thing, 
was taken back by the community and a socially desirable outcome was achieved.17 
 The actual scope of the privilege varies from state to state.18 In Utah, for example, the 
communication does not necessarily need to be penitential, but must be made in confidence for the 
purpose of religious guidance.19 However, the clergy-penitent privilege is not a carte blanche 
protection for all religious communications.20 It generally requires communications made directly 
 
9 People v. Phillips, 1 Western L. J. 109 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813). 
10 Nestle v. Commonwealth, 470 S.E.2d 133, 138 (Va. Ct. App. 1996). 
11 People v. Phillips, 1 Western L. J. 109 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 383 (3d Cir. 1990). 
16 People v. Phillips, 1 Western L. J. 109 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813). 
17 Id. 
18 Cox v. Miller, 296 F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 2002). 
19 Scott v. Hammock, 870 P.2d 947, 956 (Utah Sup.Ct. 1994). 
20 Varner v. Stovall, 500 F.3d 491, 495-98 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing specifically the Michigan codification of the 
penitent privilege). 
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to a member of the clergy.21 These statements must be made in confidence.22 This does not include 
written communications.23 Additionally, the oral statements must be made for the purposes of 
spiritual guidance.24 In some instances the communications have been deemed privileged even 
when made as nonpenitential communication.25 In that example the court has insisted that the other 
elements, confidential communication for spiritual guidance, be satisfied to consider the 
communication as privileged.26 The intricacies of the privilege differ from state to state. 
 One significant point of distinction is the possessor of the privilege. States differ on 
whether the layperson or the clergyman holds the privilege.27 This distinction sets the penitent 
privilege apart from other privileges, in which typically the layperson alone possesses the 
privilege.28 The purpose of the privilege does not differ from state to state. 
 The protection of the clergy privilege is only one of many competing public policy 
concerns. Controversies, especially surrounding the Roman Catholic Church, have placed 
increased pressure on mandatory reporting.29 Under CAPTA, a greater emphasis has been placed 
on assessing, screening, and investigating reports of child maltreatment.30 CAPTA requires each 
state to have provisions in place requiring certain individuals to report this maltreatment.31 Most 
 
21 Id. 
22 People v. Compobello, 810 N.E.2d 307, 321 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (ruling that statements made in front of a third 
party will not be privileged unless that third party is vital to the act of confession). 
23 Id. at 497 (holding that statements in a journal entry to God would not be protected).  
24 Cox v. Miller, 296 F.3d 89, 110-11 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that statements made to members of Alcoholics 
Anonymous were not protected because the statements in question were made to unburden and seek practical 
guidance). 
25 Scott v. Hammock, 870 P.2d 947, 954 (ruling that the “broad construction of the clergy-penitent privilege is 
consistent with the purpose of its secular analogue.”). 
26 Id. at 956. 
27 Compare State v. J.G., 201 N.J. 369 (2010) (which states the privilege belongs to both the cleric and the penitent 
and neither may waive it alone) with Nestle v. Commonwealth, 470 S.E.2d 133, 137 (Va. Ct. App. 1996) (holding 
that the privilege belongs to the clergyman and not the layperson). 
28 Nestle v. Commonwealth, 470 S.E.2d 133, 137 (Va. Ct. App. 1996) (discussing a comparison with other 
privileges such as the physician-patient and the psychologist-client privileges). 
29 Liam Stack, Colorado Report Accuses 43 Catholic Priests of Child Sex Abuse, N.Y. Times (Oct. 23, 2019) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/23/us/colorado-catholic-church-abuse-investigation.html.  
30 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 5106a. 
31 Id. 
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states have designated certain professions whose members are legally required to file reports of 
child maltreatment.32 Only approximately fifteen states list priest, rabbi, clergyman or another 
religious leader as reporters of child maltreatment.33 Clergy are mandatory reporters in other states 
even though not specifically named. For instance, three states, Indiana, New Jersey and Wyoming 
do not enumerate specific professionals instead requiring all persons to report child maltreatment.34 
Approximately eighteen states and Puerto Rico require anyone who suspects child maltreatment 
to report such suspicions.35 
 Forty-seven states have addressed the issue of privilege in their reporting laws.36 These 
states have either affirmed the privileges or denied use of the privilege as justification for failing 
to report.37 While the clergyman privilege has been widely affirmed, six states have denied it 
exclusively in this context.38 Some states, such as Washington, do not enumerate clergy as 
mandatory reporters, but the penitent privilege is reaffirmed within the reporting laws.39 Other 
states do not address the issue, such as Hawaii and New York.40 The states must balance the interest 
of reporting child maltreatment with the need to honor the First Amendment guarantees of the Free 
Exercise Clause and Establishment Clauses.41 
 
32 CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD 
ABUSE AND NEGLECT, 5-68 (2019). 
33 Id. at 3. 
34 Id. 
35 CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD 
ABUSE AND NEGLECT, 3 (2019). 
36 Id. at 4 (excluding Connecticut, Mississippi, New Jersey and Puerto Rico). 
37 Id. 
38 CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD 
ABUSE AND NEGLECT, 4 (2019) (Six states and one territory, New Hampshire North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode 
Island, Texas, West Virginia and Guam disallow the use of the penitent privilege as grounds for failure to report.). 
39 CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES. CLERGY AS MANDATORY 
REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, 2 (2019). 
40 Id. at 6-20. 
41 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (expressly incorporating the Free exercise clause of the First 
Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (incorporating the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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The need to report, as mandated by state statutes via CAPTA, has come in conflict with the 
clergy privilege in recent years.42 In People v. Campobello, the Illinois Appellate Court had to 
consider its state CAPTA reporting statute when a Roman Catholic priest was charged with an 
alleged sexual assault of a young girl.43 The Catholic Diocese conducted an internal investigation, 
but refused to turn over the results, arguing penitent privilege protection.44 The Diocese argued 
that communications between the Bishop and the priest in a professional capacity or as a spiritual 
adviser was statutorily protected as privileged.45  
The Campobello court had previously determined that a clergyman’s professional capacity 
was not broader than his or her role as a spiritual advisor.46 In People v. Bole, the minister testified 
that he told the penitent defendant he was ineligible for counseling after he had previously lied to 
the minister.47 The court held that the defendant’s admissions “were not obtained by the minister 
in his professional character or as a spiritual adviser.”48 The Campobello court determined that the 
pivotal phrase in the Illinois penitent privilege statute as “spiritual advisor in the course of the 
discipline.”49 The Appellate Court concluded that the Diocese must produce all internal reports to 
an in camera inspection to further evaluate the claim of privilege.50  
The current Illinois state statute on mandatory reporting explicitly affirms the clergyman 
privilege, staying that “[a] member of the clergy may claim the privilege under §8-803 of the Code 
 
42 Mayeux v. Charlet, 203 So.3d 1030 (La. 2016); People v. Campobello, 810 N.E 2d 307 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). 
43 People v. Campobello, 810 N.E. 2d 307 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). 
44 Id. at 311 (arguing that the report contained “religious thoughts and ideas of members of the Church”). 
45 Campobello, 810 N.E.2d at 319. 
46 Id. (citing People v. Bole, 585 N.E.2d 135, 147 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)). 
47 People v. Bole, 585 N.E.2d 135, 147 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). 
48 Id. 
49 Campobello, 810 N.E.2d at 320 (concluding that no “case or statute defines it”). 
50 Id. at 322. (No subsequent procedural history exists to determine whether this communication was in fact 
protected by the penitent privilege or not). 
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of Civil Procedure.”51 It could be argued that the above communication, between members of the 
clergy, would not be protected by the privilege as it was in writing, and the privilege does not 
extend to written communications.  If the communications were made orally between members of 
clergy for the purpose of spiritual guidance in a matter of discipline, it may be protected from 
discovery.52 However, the communications must be turned over to the court to determine what is 
protected.53 
Similar communications may continue to be classified as confidential under the penitent 
privilege. Unfortunately, this is not the only instance of conflict between the privilege and 
mandatory reporting statutes. 
In Roman Catholic Diocese v. Morrison, the Roman Catholic Diocese claimed priest-
penitent privilege in response to a child abuse scandal.54 The Court noted that while the Diocese 
claims the privilege for most of its documents, it only applies to “communication [] made ‘to a 
clergyman [or woman] in his [or her] professional character as spiritual adviser.”55 The Court 
concluded that several documents failed to qualify for this privilege because they “were clearly 
not directed to anyone in their ‘professional character as spiritual adviser.’”56 Similar to 
Campobello, the Mississippi State Supreme Court requires a review of all documents claimed to 
be confidential.57 
 
51 CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CLERGY AS MANDATORY 
REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, 8 (2019) (quoting Comp. Stat. Ch. 325, §5/4). 
52 See generally People v. Campobello, 810 N.E.2d at 318-22. 
53 Id. at 322. 
54 Roman Catholic Diocese v. Morrison, 905 So. 2d 1213, 1222-23, 1245-46 (2005) (the penitent privilege being one 
of several privileges alleged by the Diocese). 
55 Roman Catholic Diocese v. Morrison, 90 So. 2d at 1246 (quoting Miss. R. Evid. 505(b)). 
56 Id. (quoting Miss. R. Evid. 505(b)). 
57 Id. at 1248. 
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The current Mississippi state CAPTA statute does not address the penitent privilege in its 
mandatory reporting statute.58 However, it does state that any minister with reasonable cause to 
suspect maltreatment must orally report that suspicion immediately.59  
 More recently, in Mayeux v. Charlet, Rebecca Mayeux was allegedly sexually assaulted 
by long time parishioner and President of the Catholic funeral home.60 The Mayeux family alleged 
that the Catholic Diocese of Baton Rouge failed to report the sexual abuse.61 The family alleged 
that a friar had knowledge of inappropriate sexual contact between the daughter and a church 
official, but failed to report on it pursuant to the state’s mandatory reporting statute.62 The Diocese 
moved to exclude any confessions made by Rebecca to the friar because any and all confessions 
were made to the friar in his professional capacity and for spiritual guidance, entitling them to the 
penitent privilege.63 
 The Louisiana State Supreme Court concluded that priests are not mandatory reporters 
under either the former or current statute.64 The Court looked to the former reporting statute which 
excludes members of clergy from reporting any confidential communication, especially when 
there is a duty to keep such communications confidential.65 The Court concluded that, because the 
former statute had a carve out for clergymen, they were not mandatory reporters under the current 
statute either.66 The current version of the Louisiana mandatory reporting statute states that: 
[a] member of the clergy is not required to report a confidential communication . . 
. from a person to a member of the clergy who in the course of the discipline or 
practice of that church . . . is authorized to hear and is accustomed to hearing 
 
58 CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CLERGY AS MANDATORY 
REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, 11 (2019) (quoting Ann. Code § 43-21-353(1)). 
59 Id. (quoting Ann. Code § 43-21-353(1)). 
60 Mayeux v. Charlet, 203 So.3d 1030, 1032 (La. 2016). 
61 Id. 
62  Id. 
63 Id. at 1033. 
64 Mayeux, 203 So.3d at 1038-40. 
65 Id. at 1036 (citing La. Child. Code art. 603(15)). 
66 Id. at 1038 (citing La. Child. Code art. 609). 
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confidential communication and, under the discipline or tenets of that church . . . 
has a duty to keep such communications confidential.67 
 This statute was changed in light of CAPTA requirements but continues to utilize much of 
the language interpreted in Mayeux.68 In both Mayeux and Morrison, the reporting statute has been 
usurped by the penitent privilege, which appear to protect the clergy. The Diocese in both cases 
interpreted the penitent privilege to include communications between members of the clergy 
because the communications were in the course of discipline.69 The friar was protected by the 
privilege because he was a member of the clergy and communicated with administration for 
disciplinary purposes.70 It is likely that the same outcome would be reached in a case today, as 
little of the statutory language has changed.71   
 These three decisions walk the tight line of public interests. On one hand, the courts must 
protect the public welfare and goals of the state CAPTA statutes, but on the other hand the states 
must ensure the free exercise of religion and respect the penitent privilege. While the evidentiary 
decisions of these cases may shock the public conscience, the information being excluded may not 
impede all investigations or proceedings. The privilege is designed to encourage spiritual 
communications and self-discipline through one’s religious institutions.72 The penitent privilege 
is not intended to frustrate the criminal justice system, and it cannot prevent the discovery of non-
privileged information.73 
 
67 CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CLERGY AS MANDATORY 
REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, 9 (2019) (quoting Children’s Code Art. 603(17)(b)-(c)). 
68 Compare Children’s Code Art. 603(17)(b)-(c) with Mayeux, 203 So.3d at 1038 (quoting then active La. Child. 
Code. art. 609). 
69 See generally Mayeux v. Charlet, 203 So.3d 1030 (La. 2016); People v. Campobello, 810 N.E 2d 307 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2004). 
70 Mayeux, 203 So.3d at 1038-40. 
71 See generally Mayeux v. Charlet, 203 So.3d 1030 (La. 2016); People v. Campobello, 810 N.E 2d 307 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2004). 
72 People v. Phillips, 1 Western L. J. 109 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813). 
73 Id. 
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 The frustration surrounding the penitent privilege stem from the sex abuse scandals and 
the clergy that have hid behind the privilege.74 These cases differ from the original justification of 
the penitent privilege. Under Phillips, the privilege exists to protect the penitent and their search 
for spiritual absolution.75 However, the penitent privilege in modern cases is wielded more by 
church administrators and priests than penitent laypeople.76 The social good in these cases has 
shifted from protecting the penitent practitioner of religion to exposing the misdeeds of religious 
leaders who prey on vulnerable members of the community. The attempt to hide behind the 
penitent privilege has shifted public perception of this protection. However, the penitent privilege 
was not envisioned to protect the abuses committed by religious leaders. Despite these efforts, it 
is still possible to discover the concealed evidence.  
It is important to note that evidence protected by the penitent privilege, like any other 
privilege, may still be admissible through another evidentiary avenue. The Supreme Court has held 
that confidential or privileged communications are admissible when they are acquired from an 
independent source, removed from the privileged conversation.77 Under the independent source 
doctrine, statements by the penitent or statements that are not made in confidence are not protected 
by the penitent privilege and are completely discoverable.  
Clergy must report these unprotected statements in states that classify them as mandatory 
reporters or mandatory reporters with reasonable suspicion of child mistreatment. Additionally, 
witnesses to acts of child maltreatment may safely report instances of child maltreatment because 
 
74 Liam Stack, Colorado Report Accuses 43 Catholic Priests of Child Sex Abuse, N.Y. Times (Oct. 23, 2019) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/23/us/colorado-catholic-church-abuse-investigation.html. 
75 People v. Phillips, 1 Western L. J. 109 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813). 
76 Mayeux v. Charlet, 203 So.3d 1030 (La. 2016); People v. Campobello, 810 N.E. 2d 307, 318-22 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2004). 
77 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963). 
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instances of abuse or neglect are not communications for the purpose of spiritual guidance and 
would not be protected by the penitent privilege.78 
In addition to the independent source doctrine, the inevitable discovery exception has also 
been applied.79 Either doctrine can be used to circumvent potential conflicts between penitent 
privilege and CAPTA. It is important to reemphasize that in most cases the penitent is the one that 
holds the privilege and may divulge the communications at their discretion.80 The few exceptions, 
in which the clergyman holds the privilege entrust the power to the spiritual advisor to act in accord 
with his or her conscience.81 In those instances the privilege could not “be affected by the 
communicant.”82 Based on this unique interpretation, it is unclear would may happen in the event 
of the death of a clergyman who possesses the penitent privilege. If the holder of the penitent 
privilege expresses intent to breach the privilege, that evidence may be discoverable, as well as the 
method of discovery discussed above. The exclusionary nature of the penitent privilege does not 
suppress all evidence and is not designed to. The privilege will only be used to exclude evidence 
to vindicate or protect the holder of the privilege.83 
 Despite the intricacies and differences, the penitent privilege functions like any other 
privilege. It bars evidences that was intended to be kept in confidence, for the purpose of seeking 
aid.84 The states’ CAPTA compliant statutes can do little to address the penitent privilege. Some 
have denied the privilege in instances of child maltreatment, but it appears those instances have 
 
78 See generally People v. Campobello, 810 N.E.2d at 318-22. 
79 See People v. Burnidge, 687 N.E.2d 813, 816-17 (Ill. 1997) (holding that evidence which will inevitably be 
discovered without error or misconduct may still be admitted) (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984)).  
80 Compare State v. J.G., 201 N.J. 369 (2010) (which states the privilege belongs to both the cleric and the penitent 
and neither may waive it alone) with Nestle v. Commonwealth, 470 S.E.2d 133, 137 (Va. Ct. App. 1996) (holding 
that the privilege belongs to the clergyman and not the layperson). 
81 Nestle v. Commonwealth, 470 S.E.2d 133, 137 (Va. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Seidman v. Fishburne-Hudgins Educ. 
Found., Inc., 724 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1984)). 
82 Id. at fn. 3 (discussing the omission of penitent’s consent from this privilege alone). 
83 People v. Burnidge, 687 N.E.2d 813, 818 (Ill. 1997). 
84 Nestle v. Commonwealth, 470 S.E.2d 133, 137 (Va. Ct. App. 1996). 
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yet to be litigated in a significant capacity. It could be argued that limiting the penitent privilege 
in any context may carry free exercise implications, as it inhibits a religious practice that is 
fundamental to certain religious faiths.85 
Section III – Free Exercise Clause Considerations 
The penitent privilege supports the free exercise of religion, promoting spiritual guidance 
and communication.86 Under the Free Exercise Clause, “Congress shall make no law . . . 
prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].”87 This has been translated by the Supreme Court to 
mean a mandated noninterference with religion.88 Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence was 
reinforced with the passing of RFRA which considers free exercise an “unalienable right” and 
requires laws affecting free exercise to be the least restrictive means to advancing a compelling 
government interest.89 
It can be argued that the penitent privilege is necessary to the free exercise of religion in 
this country. The court in Phillips called religious rites, such as the sacrament of confession, 
essential to the free exercise of religion.90 The court ruled that the ability to participate in religious 
rites is vital to the free exercise of religion.91 There is an emphasis on the veil of secrecy, which 
the court finds vital to confession and the Catholic church as a whole.92 The confidence is stated 
to be of theological importance, not political.93 If the privilege were unnecessarily constricted or 
 
85 See People v. Phillips, 1 Western L. J. 109 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813). 
86 People v. Phillips, 1 Western L. J. 109 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813). 
87 U.S. CONST. Amend. I, § 1. 
88 Walz v. Tax Com. Of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970). 
89 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a). 
90 People v. Phillips, 1 Western L. J. 109 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813). 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
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read too narrowly, it may inhibit the religious from seeking religious reconciliation.94 The penitent 
privilege depends on a sense of complete confidentiality.95 
It could be argued that the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA require the penitent privilege 
to continue to exist in its current state. It may not be possible to curtail the privilege without 
violating RFRA. Under RFRA, any substantial burden on the free exercise of religion must be 
justified by a compelling governmental interest that does not have a possibly less restrictive 
alternative.96  
The burden on religious exercise would be substantial if the penitent privilege were 
eliminated or narrowed. If certain statements or methods of communication with clergy were no 
longer protected, the rite of confession and penance would be greatly inhibited.97 The government 
would have to put forth a compelling government interest. The Supreme Court established a strict 
scrutiny standard of review because this is a “highly sensitive constitutional area.”98  
The government would have to show that it lacks other methods of achieving its goals 
without burdening religion.99 Religious groups could argue that the privilege itself is the least 
restrictive alternative: it is very narrow and does not interfere with mandatory duties when 
confidential communications are not involved. This privilege, like all privileges has exceptions 
and ways to circumvent the privilege. The penitent privilege exists to advance spiritual 
communications and seek discipline through the exercise of religion.100 It would be more 
restrictive on the free exercise of religion to restrict how the penitent may converse with their 
 
94 Scott v. Hammock, 870 P.2d 947, 954 (Utah 1994). 
95 Id. 
96 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963). 
97 See generally Scott v. Hammock, 870 P.2d 947, 954 (Utah 1994); People v. Phillips, 1 Western L. J. 109 (N.Y. 
Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813). 
98 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1944). 
99 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 728 (2014). 
100 People v. Campobello, 810 N.E. 2d 307, 318-22 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). 
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clergy and seek religious absolution. Restrictions on the sacrament of confession would not 
necessarily advance the interests set forth by the government. Holding priests in contempt for 
failure to disclose penitent communications, for example, would not advance the interests of the 
government, nor public policy in general. 
The penitent privilege encourages the penitent to come forward and seek spiritual guidance 
from their religious leaders and request absolution.101 The government could simply encourage the 
clergy to encourage the penitent to come forward and confess these statements to the police.102 
This would preserve the free exercise of religion through the ceremony of confession as well as 
encourage the reporting of allegations of child maltreatment by those seeking religious absolution.  
As discussed above, information discovered outside of confidence is still discoverable and 
serves the government’s compelling interest. Reports of child maltreatment can still come from 
clergy and those that witness child maltreatment or hear conversations of child maltreatment 
communicated outside of the context of confession or spiritual guidance. The clergy are still 
required to report witnessed incidents of child maltreatment, for example. Therefore, it can be 
argued that RFRA may require that the penitent privilege to persist because it is the less restrictive 
alternative available that serves the government’s interest and promotes the free exercise of 
religion. 
A repeal of the Clergy Privilege may seem similar to the legislature’s action in Church of 
Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, in which the city council attempted to curtail free exercise 
under the pretext of a generally applicable statute.103 By repealing a religious privilege, religious 
 
101 See generally People v. Campobello, 810 N.E. 2d 307, 318-22 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). 
102 CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CLERGY AS MANDATORY 
REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, 9 (2019) (quoting Children’s Code Art. 603(17)(b)-(c) which states 
that “clergy shall encourage that person to report the allegations to the appropriate authorities.”). 
103 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
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organizations may argue that the government is attacking a religious practice through a supposed 
general statute.104 It could be argued that since this privilege still exists for lawyers and therapists, 
religion alone is being targeted. Without a compelling interest, such targeting is unconstitutional.  
A Lukumi analysis would be necessary in states such as New Hampshire and West 
Virginia, which under their respective CAPTA statutes, abrogated the clergy privilege.105 The 
West Virginia statute, for example, abrogated all privileged communications except for attorney-
client privilege in situations of known or suspected child maltreatment.106 Additionally, the West 
Virginia statute mandates that any member of the clergy with reasonable suspicion of child 
maltreatment or whom has observed such maltreatment must immediately report the circumstances 
within twenty-four hours of the suspicion.107  
A clergyperson could bring a challenge under Lukumi, arguing that the generally 
applicable law is unfairly targeting religion. This would be a relatively weak case however, as 
most other privileges are abrogated as well as the penitent privilege. This situation is unlike 
Lukumi, as there are not exceptions for the other privileges affected.108 The only similarity to 
Lukumi in this instance is that not all privileges are abrogated, so the law is not generally applicable 
or facially neutral. 109 In that case, strict scrutiny applies to the government’s action.110 The state 
could argue that there is not a significant burden on religion, as the facially neutral abrogation only 
 
104 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
105 CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CLERGY AS MANDATORY 
REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, at 2 (2019). 
106 Id. at 19 (quoting Ann. Code § 49-2-811). 
107 Id. at 19 (quoting Ann. Code § 49-2-803). 
108 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 535-36 (1993) (in which food establishments 
and kosher killing of animals were excluded from the prohibition of ritualistic animal killing). 
109 Compare Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 535-36 (1993) with CHILDREN’S 
BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CLERGY AS MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD 
ABUSE AND NEGLECT, 19 (2019) (quoting Ann. Code § 49-2-803, excluding the attorney-client privilege from the 
abrogation). 
110 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 535-36 (1993). 
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impact statements involving evidence or suspicion of child maltreatment. The West Virginia 
legislature could argue that there is a compelling government interest and that this is not a facially 
neutral attempt to restrict religious practice.  
There is an important public policy concern at issue when the state legislature mandates 
the reporting of child maltreatment. The state intends to suspend husband-wife and professional-
client privileges to ensure that anyone with evidence or suspicion of child maltreatment may come 
forward and that their evidence may be admissible in court.111 The State may argue that attorney-
client privilege must be preserved to ensure the confidentiality in preparation for litigation.  
The state has only abrogated privileges that may directly concern an instance or suspicion 
of maltreatment that is not yet being litigated. The preservation of the attorney-client privilege is 
to ensure the privacy and honesty in the realm of litigation, which would certainly be applicable 
in child maltreatment cases. New Hampshire has taken similar language, only preserving the 
attorney-client privilege.112 The statutes in both West Virginia and New Hampshire would most 
likely survive a Lukumi challenge, as there does not appear to be any legislative intent to target 
religion or provide exceptions to nonreligious privileges, except the attorney-client privilege.113 It 
appears that the abrogation does not specifically burden religious exercise alone. The abrogation 
affects medical privilege as well. The abrogation would be an issue if it only burdened conduct 
motivated by religious belief.114 
 
111 See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CLERGY AS MANDATORY 
REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, 19 (2019) (quoting Ann. Code. § 49-2-803). 
112 Id. at 13 (quoting Rev. Stat. § 169-C:32). 
113 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. V. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (holding the requirement for 
government neutrality  and respect for religion in order to comply with the Free exercise Clause); Trinity Lutheran 
Church v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017) (excluding religion form a benefit based on religious status violated the 
Free Exercise Clause). 
114 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 542-43. 
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It may be argued that under the Free Exercise Clause the penitent privilege must persist in 
order to permit the uninhibited practice of a religious rite. The penitent privilege has been deeply 
rooted in American history as one of the oldest privileges and protections for religious practice. 
The need for the government to refrain from interreference is guaranteed by Free Exercise Clause, 
but the Free Exercise Clause often intersects with the issue of state accommodation under the 
Establishment Clause.115 
Section IV – Establishment Clause Considerations 
 Challenges to the penitent privilege arise from Establishment Clause grounds. Under the 
Establishment Clause, “Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion”.116 
Critics of the privilege may argue that this privilege is an unconstitutional endorsement of 
religion.117 However, the privilege is only one of several privileges that holds communications in 
confidence. It could be argued that the preservation of the penitent privilege is only another 
permissible accommodation under the Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The triumvirate of 
Walz v. Tax Com. Of New York, Lemon v. Kurtzman, and Corp. of Pres. Bishop v. Amos govern 
this discussion. 
 The government cannot become extensively involved with religion.118 The penitent 
privilege, although protecting communications in a religious context, is not unlike other general 
exceptions afforded to religion. In Walz v. Tax Com. Of New York, the Supreme Court held that 
tax exemption status afforded to religious institutions did not violate the Establishment Clause 
because many other organizations were exempt as well.119 Like the tax exemption, the penitent 
 
115 See Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970). 
116 U.S. CONST. Amend. I, § 1. 
117 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (O’Connor, J. concurring). Justice O’Connor announced an 
endorsement test which focuses “on institutional entanglement and on endorsement or disapproval of religion [to 
clarify] the Lemon test as an analytical device.” 
118 Id. at 689-90. 
119 Id. at 676. 
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privilege is not an exclusive benefit awarded to the church alone. Privileges exist for all manner 
of communications with professionals, ranging from doctors and psychiatrists to attorneys and 
therapists.120 The Supreme Court in Walz held that it was a permissible accommodation to grant 
an exemption to religion when other exemptions were already granted.121 The penitent privilege is 
just one of many privileges, like the exemption granted in Walz.  
Under Lemon v. Kurtzman, in order to satisfy the Establishment Clause, legislation must 
be secular in purpose, must not advance nor inhibit religion, and it must not create entanglement 
between the legislature and religion.122 This is all done to ensure that the legislature does not 
establish, sponsor or support religion.123  
An accommodation afforded for a religious institution or religious practice cannot delegate 
civic or political authority to a group chosen “according to a religious criterion.”124 The emphasis, 
in the eyes of the Supreme Court, should be on the neutrality of the accommodation.125 Legislators 
must honor the neutrality between various religious institutions.126 
 Additionally, in Corp. of Pres. Bishop v. Amos, the Supreme Court held that, to be 
constitutional under the Establishment Clause, certain exemptions must promote free exercise.127 
Justice Brennan, in his concurrence, elaborates, saying that certain exceptions can promote the 
autonomy and free exercise of the church.128 
 
120 See generally Nestle v. Commonwealth, 470 S.E.2d 133, 137 (Va. Ct. App. 1996). 
121 Walz, 397 U.S. at 689-90. 
122 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
123 See Walz v. Tax Com. of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970). 
124 Bd. Of Educ. V. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 698 (1994). 
125 Id. at 697. 
126 Id. at 706-707 (citing Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. at 244-46). 
127 Corp. of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 333-35 
(1987). 
128 Id. at 2871. 
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Courts would uphold the penitent privilege if they apply the jurisprudence discussed above. 
The CAPTA statutes are narrowly tailored to protect only what is necessary, the confidential 
communications of the clergy in a disciplinary, spiritual guidance context.  
However, the Louisiana State Supreme Court has granted the penitent privilege, and the 
clergy in general, a wider breadth of protections than other states. According to the Louisiana’s 
Supreme Court, the penitent privilege exempts members of the clergy from any mandatory 
reporting requirement.129 Members of the clergy in Louisiana are not mandatory reporters in any 
context.130 This interpretation deviates from other states. A minority of states, Indiana, New Jersey, 
and Wyoming, do not list specific occupations, but require that everyone is a mandatory reporter 
when there is reasonable suspicion.131 However, Louisiana’s State Supreme Court has interpreted 
the omission of clergy from the mandatory reporting statute as an intentional exclusion from the 
duty to report.132 
The Louisiana Supreme Court gave a broad interpretation of a relatively narrow statute. 
This could arguably be an impermissible accommodation, as it gives greater latitude to religion. 
Other professionals, such as health practitioners, mental health practitioners or social workers are 
still mandatory reporters.133 The Louisiana statute on privileged communications explicitly deals 
with the penitent privilege separately, addressing it in detail before covering other professional 
privileges.134 The statute states that mental health or social service practitioners are excluded from 
the mandatory reporter law when professional legal representation is involved.135 This restriction 
 
129 Mayeux, 203 So.3d at 1038-40. 
130 Id. 
131 CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD 
ABUSE AND NEGLECT, 3 (2019). 
132 Mayeux, 203 So.3d at 1038-40. 
133 CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD 
ABUSE AND NEGLECT, 28 (2019). 
134 Id. at 29 (quoting Children’s Code Art. 603(17); 609). 
135 Id. 
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on secular privilege is more narrow than the ruling of the Louisiana Supreme Court which 
interpreted the legislative intent to exclude clergy from the list of mandatory reporters 
altogether.136 
 The interpretation of the Louisiana statute, and the statutes that do not list clergy as 
mandatory reporters, may run afoul of the Establishment Clause. It could be argued that these 
statutes are an impermissible accommodation of religion, incongruous with the Establishment 
Clause. The statutes on their face would satisfy the first prong of Lemon because they are secular 
in purpose.137 The secular purpose is to require the reporting of actual or suspected child 
maltreatment from those who have witnessed or have reasonable suspicion of such conduct.138 The 
statues pertaining to the statute of clergy may be at issue with the second prong of the Lemon test.  
In addition to the secular purpose, the legislation must not advance or inhibit religion and 
must not lead to government entanglement.139 It may be argued that the statutes that do not 
explicitly or implicitly mandate reporting are unfairly biased towards religion. In states such as 
Alaska and Washington, members of the clergy are not covered by an explicit section of the 
reporting law and not covered by an “any person” provision.140 Instead, clergy in Washington are 
provided statutory immunity from liability if they elect to report.141 This is to protect the clergy 
from the fear of the penitent raising breach of fiduciary duty claims against them. The Washington 
statute may unfairly favor religion, as many professions are required to report.142 While this statute 
 
136 Mayeux, 203 So.3d at 1038-40. 
137 See generally CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, MANDATORY 
REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (2019). 
138 Id. 
139 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
140 See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CLERGY AS MANDATORY 
REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, 3 (2019). 
141 Id. at fn. 6. 
142 CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD 
ABUSE AND NEGLECT, 64 (2019) (quoting Rev. Code § 26.44.030 which includes required reporters such as law 
enforcement officers, professional school personnel, nurses, social workers, and psychologists). 
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does excuse all reporters from divulging privileged communications, it still requires secular 
reporters to remain vigilant while members of the clergy are now exempt.143 The statute also 
provides protection for those with confidential communication  who come forward, such as 
“clergy-penitent and physician-patient privilege.”144 This is the only explicit mention of clergy, 
however.145 
By requiring fewer requirements on sectarian professions than secular professions, it could 
be argued that the Washington statute violates the Establishment Clause. The duty to report is a 
legal requirement set forth in statute that requires professionals to take an active role in reporting 
child maltreatment. If the clergy are not required to participate in this program, it protects them 
from the possibility of violating the statue.  
It could be argued that these statutes do not involve entanglement between the government 
and religious institutions. The involvement with religious institutions is minimal. In the statutes 
that require it, the clergy must report instances or suspicion of child maltreatment, as with other 
secular professions.146 These statutes do not regulate religious practices or the grant the religious 
institutions any legislative power.147 
 The penitent privilege would be an impermissible accommodation in the lens of the 
Establishment Clause if religious institutions alone had the power to take statements in confidence, 
excluding them from admissible discovery on their own terms.148 When an exemption lacks 
sufficient breadth or is exclusive to religion, it will fail the Establishment Clause because it 
 
143 Id. (quoting Rev. Code §§ 26.44.030; 26.44.060). 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CLERGY AS MANDATORY 
REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, 5 (2019) (quoting California’s Penal Code § 11166(d)). 
147 See generally CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CLERGY AS 
MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (2019). 
148 See generally Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
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impermissibly favors religion.149 The Supreme Court has emphasized that breadth matters when 
holding that a particular exclusion does not promote a religion or religious practices over secular 
ones.150 It can be argued that the standard of privileged communications, held in confidence is 
substantially broad as it is one privilege among many and is the only privilege to incorporate 
religious practices.151 
While it is argued that the privilege does not discriminate against denominations, the act 
of secret communication is not universally shared between all religions.152 Some cases reference 
the roots of confession and the Catholic church specifically in discussing the history of the 
privilege.153 It can be argued that this causes the privilege to fail the Establishment Clause because 
one religion cannot be officially preferred over another.154 This discrepancy may raise concerns 
about favoritism and the endorsement of specific religions. Such preference would run against the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  
However, the privilege exists for any religious group that utilizes secretive, repentant 
dialogue with a spiritual guide for the purposes of spiritual guidance.155 The privilege does not 
explicitly name a sect or denomination protected by this privilege. Therefore, it can be argued that 
 
149 Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 12 (1989). 
150 Id. 
151 N.J.S.A. §2A:84A-22 (discussing marital privilege); N.J.S.A. §2A:84A-22.2 (discussing patient-physician 
privilege); and N.J.S.A. §2A:84A-23 (discussing cleric-penitent privilege). 
152 See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 253-54 (1982) (holding that a Minnesota statute that required only certain 
religious sects to register and report was an impermissible and uneven accommodation of religion which could be 
seen as the exact favoritism the First Amendment forbids); Compare Varner v. Stovall, 500 F.3d at 499 (stating that 
there is no sectarian affiliation with the penitent privilege) with Quran 3:16 (which believes in confession of sins to 
Allah alone through the practice of Istighfar) and Repentance by Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
President Marion G. Romney (10/05/80) (which states that confession of sins should also be made to those who have 
been affected by the sinner’s misconduct). 
153 See Lightman v. Flaum, 761 N.E.2d 1027, 1030-31 (NY 2001); Nestle v. Commonwealth, 470 S.E.2d 133, 137 
(Va. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that this was “established by the Roman Catholic Church as early as the Fifth 
Century”); People v. Phillips, 1 Western L. J. 109 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813). 
154 Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). 
155 People v. Phillips, 1 Western L. J. 109 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813). 
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the privilege’s existence does not favor one religion over another, so long as no group is explicitly 
included or excluded from the benefit of the privilege. 
It could be argued that these statutes only protect those religions that utilize the penitent 
privilege and therefore advance some religions over others. Religions that do not incorporate 
private confession into their practices, such as Islam, may argue that their penitent practices are 
not protected from mandatory reporting laws. Muslims generally do not communicate their sins to 
anyone but Allah.156 Practicing Muslims may argue that the penitent privilege establishes a 
preference for Christianity.  
It may be argued that there is implicit bias in the penitent privilege. The penitent privilege 
in New Jersey, for example, protects confidential communications to a cleric in their “professional 
character” or to a spiritual advisor for disciplinary purposes or as a religious practice.157  If a 
Muslim practitioner shares his or her penance with another member of their Mosque, it may not 
be protected because it may not be a religious practice of the church.  
Additionally, members of the Church of the Latter-Day Saints would not be protected by 
this statute either, as confessing to another member of the congregation would not be to a cleric or 
spiritual advisor, despite being a religious practice for the purposes of spiritual guidance and 
discipline. These two faiths are only two examples of those that do not utilize the penitent privilege. 
Despite these arguments, it may be best from an Establishment Clause standpoint to leave the 
penitent privilege as it is. 
The Establishment Clause prevents the explicit endorsement or inhibition of a religion.158 
However, the penitent privilege is still a permissible accommodation for religion. The penitent 
 
156 See Quran 3:16 (which professes the confession of sins to Allah alone through the practice of Istighfar). 
157 N.J.S.A. §24:84A-23. 
158 See generally Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
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privilege serves to protect all confidential communications in order to encourage the pursuit of 
spiritual guidance.159 The penitent privilege exists to provide confidentiality to those religions that 
utilize a confidential rite of confession. It does not explicitly list or favor one religion over another. 
It does not actively exclude any specific religion from utilizing the privilege.  
Those religions that do not utilizing confession naturally cannot benefit from the privileges 
surrounding confession. It would violate the Establishment Clause if the government created 
individual immunities for all religions, including those not covered by the penitent privilege. Under 
the Lemon test, legislation cannot create government entanglement with religion.160 It would be 
excessive government entanglement for legislators to create privileges and protections for every 
specific religion to protect communications. This could arguably lead the government to regulate 
and protect certain religious practices to ensure equal protection of various religious groups. This 
line of accommodations would create a slippery slope as various religious communication 
protections would need to be evaluated to make sure that the statutes do not favor or inhibit 
religion. This would lead to impermissible accommodations. 
It is safer for the states to maintain the penitent privilege, as it is the best option to maintain 
a facially neutral accommodation. Those religions that choose to incorporate an act of confession 
held in confidence can benefit from the act, while other religions handle their rites of penance 
differently. The penitent privilege is wide enough and sufficiently neutral to accommodate all 
religions. It protects religious, confidential communications with a spiritual leader, in their 
professional or spiritual capacity, in order to obtain guidance.161 These factors, similar to the 
language in other state statutes, allow the religions to determine if the privilege protects them in 
 
159 See N.J.S.A. §24:84A-23. 
160 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
161 See N.J.S.A. §24:84A-23. 
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their practices. This ensures that the government respects the free exercise of religion and does not 
endorse one religion over another. 
The penitent privilege generally does not run afoul of the Establishment Clause. The issues 
arise when evaluating the state compliant CAPTA statutes. The statutes handle the penitent 
privilege differently depending on the positions of each state. States such as Louisiana and 
Washington are arguably overbroad in the leeway granted clergy. When the states do not qualify 
the clergy are mandatory reporters, it can be argued that the states are endorsing religion.  
The CAPTA statutes may fail the Lemon test if they advance or inhibit certain religions or 
show excessive entanglement depending on how they handle the role of clergy in their reporting 
statutes. The privilege does not favor certain religions just because certain religions do not practice 
the act of confession. It would create greater Establishment Clause issues if independent caveats 
for religions that do not actively incorporate the rite of confidential confession into their religious 
practices. It would create greater challenges for religious groups and legislators if the penitent 
privilege were repealed or abrogated on Establishment Clause grounds. 
Section V – Conclusion 
 The penitent privilege is one of the oldest privileges afforded to confidential 
communications. The privilege protects the communications of the clergyman and the penitent to 
further the free exercise of religion and encourage the religious sacrament of confession. While 
each state has drafted the privilege slightly differently, the privilege generally requires a 
confidential communication with a professional in their capacity as a spiritual leader for the 
purposes of spiritual guidance. This privilege is typically possessed by the penitent, though some 
states have vested the penitent privilege with the clergyman.  
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The penitent privilege comes into conflict with state compliant CAPTA statutes. The 
interest of protecting spiritual guidance is forced to compete with the state interest of preventing 
child maltreatment. However, many states have affirmed the penitent privilege within their 
CAPTA statutes. Only a handful of states have denied the use of the penitent privilege as grounds 
for refusing to report child maltreatment. In three cases, state courts have held that internal 
communications were protected by the penitent privilege because clergyman were communicating 
with church administration in a disciplinary context while in their professional capacity as spiritual 
advisors. The outcomes of these cases would not change when applying the respective states’ 
current child reporting statutes. 
 The penitent privilege is closely protected by RFRA which ensures the free exercise of 
religion by reinstating the compelling interest test for free exercise claims. RFRA safeguards the 
free exercise of religion by requiring facially neutral statutes that affect religion to advance a 
compelling state interest without a less restrictive alternative. It may be argued that it is a less 
restrictive alternative to simply allow the penitent privilege to persist. The removal of the penitent 
privilege would inhibit the religious sacrament of confession.  
 The penitent privilege itself does not violate on the Establishment Clause. This is only one 
of many privileges protecting secretive communications, held in confidence. It is a permissible 
accommodation to permit the penitent privilege in addition to the other professional privileges. 
The Establishment Clause issues arise when the penitent privilege is applied to the state compliant 
CAPTA statutes. Different states handle the clergyman privilege differently in their reporting 
statutes. The ones that exclude the clergy from their language arguably violate the Establishment 
Clause by favoring religion. It may be argued that the penitent privilege itself favors certain 
religions over others, but it can also be argued that this supposed favoritism is the choice of the 
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religious institutions rather than the government. Overall, the penitent privilege should survive 
Establishment Clause challenges. 
 The penitent privilege’s only differentiating factor from other state-recognized privileges 
is the involvement of religious institutions. The penitent privilege has a long running history in 
this country and has been vital to the free exercise of religious rites and practices. Some wish to 
curtail this specific privilege considering controversies in the Catholic Church and the rise of 
mandatory reporting statutes. However, privilege satisfies both the Free Exercise Clause and the 
Establishment Clause, and the clergy are still required to report information that is not obtained 
through the act of confession. 
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